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In recent years, utility ownership of distributed energy resources 
(DERs)1 has become a controversial topic.  In Arizona and New Hampshire, 
for example, spirited debates have occurred between third-party developers 
 
 *   © 2015 Jeff Winmill.  Jeff Winmill is an attorney at Van Ness Feldman L.L.P. in 
Washington D.C. All opinions expressed in this Article are his own. 
 1.  PETER KIND, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS (Edison Electric Institute 2013), 
available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf. 
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and utilities seeking to participate in the growing DER economy.2  
Supporters of utility-owned DERs have generally argued that there are 
substantial system-wide benefits associated with utility investments 
in DERs, and that such investments should be encouraged.3  Opponents, 
in contrast, have argued that electric utilities have built-in advantages over 
private companies and that it would be anti-competitive to allow utilities––
and in some instance their corporate affiliates––to compete against private 
companies in the DER sector.4 
As discussed below, this debate over utility ownership of DERs is 
occurring at a time of significant change in the electric utility industry.  In 
the last decade, DER technologies have become more advanced and 
affordable, and whole industries have developed to provide customers 
with rooftop solar, microgrids5 and battery storage.6 At the same time, 
U.S. electricity sales have flat-lined, and are not expected to grow by more 
than one percent per year over the next several decades.7  Despite these 
flagging electricity sales, utilities still must make expensive infrastructure 
investments, to the tune of around $100 billion per year, which is not 
counting the over $1 trillion in unrecovered investments that utilities have 
already made in the electrical grid.8  Thus, according to many utilities, 
customers that utilize DERs, but still rely on the grid for backup power, 
 
 2.  See, e.g., Solar bill before NH House Panel Has Both Sides Shifting Stances, 
NEW HAMPSHIRE UNION LEADER (Mar. 25, 2015) available at http://www.unionleader. 
com/article/20150324/NEWS05/150329553; Davide Savenije, Who Won the Arizona 
Solar Show Down, UTILITYDIVE, Nov. 18, 2013; available at http://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/who-won-the-arizona-solar-showdown/196126/. 
 3.  See, e.g., Arizona Public Services Company, Application and Response to 
Commission Injury Decision 74237, DOCKET NO. E-O1345A-13-0140 (filed Apr. 15, 2014). 
 4.  See, e.g., L. Bird et al., Regulatory Considerations Associated With The Expanded 
Adoption of Distributed Solar, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY 26–27 (NOV. 
2013), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60613.pdf. 
 5.  SolarCity Launches Microgrid Service, Available Worldwide, SOLARCITY (Mar. 16, 
2015) available at http://www.solarcity.com/newsroom/press/solarcity-launches-microgrid- 
service-available-worldwide. 
 6.  See, e.g., Battery Backup, SOLARCITY available at http://www.solarcity.com/residential/ 
energy-storage; see also Gavin Bade, Tesla’s new home battery will have a lease option: 
report (Apr. 27, 2015), available at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/teslas-new-home-
battery-will-have-a-lease-option-report/391173/. 
 7.  Market Trends Electrticity demand, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 2015), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_electric.cfm. 
 8.  See, e.g., David Raskin, Getting Distributed Generation Right: A Response to 
“Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?”, 35 ENERGY 
L.J. 263, 266 (2014), available at http://www.felj.org/sites/default/files/docs/elj352/14-
263-282-Raskin-final-11.1.pdf. 
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do not pay their fair share of the grid’s infrastructure costs9 and inequitably 
shift  costs to non-DER users. 
This Article explores the key business and regulatory issues associated 
with utility investments in DERs, as well as important considerations for 
regulators seeking to strike the appropriate balance between DER services 
provided by third parties and DER services provided by utilities.10  Part I 
provides a brief overview of the electric utility industry, and the growth and 
impact of DERs in recent years.  Part II analyzes two emergent distributed 
technologies––solar photovoltaics (PV) and distributed storage––as well as 
utility efforts to invest in these technologies.  And Part III concludes with a 
discussion of two different regulatory models for addressing utility-
ownership of DERs: the New York Public Service Commission’s (New 
York Commission) Order Adopting the Reforming Energy Vision;11 and 
the Arizona Residential Utility Consumer Office’s (Consumer Office) 
Policy Statement on Utility Owned DG.12 
As described below, the New York Commission has established a 
regulatory regime that “do[es] not generally favor utility ownership of DER 
assets[,]” in light of the state’s preference for “competitive markets and risk 
based capital as opposed to ratepayer funding as a source of asset 
development.”13  Thus, the New York Commission has stated that it 
will restrict utility ownership of DERs to only a few narrow circumstances.  
Arizona’s Consumer Office in contrast, while not having the decision 
making authority of the New York Commission, “supports sensible and 
cost effective utility involvement in [DERs]” and suggests that “the utility 
can offer a suite of different services that confer system benefits and 
consumer protections while minimizing rate impacts.”14 
Despite these different approaches to utility-ownership of DERs, however, 
both the New York Commission and Arizona’s Consumer Office concur that, 
as a general presumption, utility investments in DERs should emphasize 
 
 9.  Rick Tempchin, Time to rethink metering rules: cost and fairness , 
INTELLIGENTUTILITY (May 29, 2013), http://www.intelligentutility.com/article/13/05/time-
rethink-metering-rules-cost-and-fairness. 
 10.  Bird, supra note 4. 
 11.  N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM, ORDER ADOPTING REGUALTORY POLICY FRAMEWORK 
AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: PROCEEDING ON MOTION OF THE COMMISSION IN REGARD TO 
REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, CASE 14-M-101 at 69 (Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter REV]. 
 12.  Arizona Residential Utility Consumer Office Comments , Docket No. E-
01933A-14-0248 (filed Oct. 17, 2014) [hereinafter RUCO Comments]. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
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markets not already being served by third parties.  Under such a 
presumption, utilities that seek to compete in established DER markets 
are thus more likely to encounter regulatory resistance, and have their DER 
proposals rejected or modified, than utilities offering new DER services 
associated with undeveloped markets.  As utilities look for new business 
opportunities, therefore, a strategic focus on underutilized DER 
technologies and business models may be beneficial for utilities. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The electric utility industry has evolved over time to include several 
categories of electricity providers with their own incentive structures, 
financing mechanisms and degrees of regulatory oversight.  In the 
United States, approximately 70 percent of the population obtains their 
electricity from investor-owned utilities (IOUs), which are shareholder 
owned companies whose retail and distribution rates are set by state 
commissions.  Under what has been referred to as the “regulatory 
compact,”15 IOUs assume an obligation to serve all customers within a 
designated service area, and are provided an opportunity to earn a regulated 
return on their investments to serve those customers under “cost of 
service” regulation.16  As private companies, IOUs are financed through a 
combination of shareholder equity and bondholder debt. Thus, IOUs must 
provide shareholders with a sufficient return on investment to obtain the 
capital needed to fund expensive infrastructure projects.  Many IOUs are 
part of larger holding companies that have unregulated affiliates or 
subsidiaries engaged in a variety of competitive, energy-related businesses, 
in addition to regulated utilities.  
In contrast to IOUs, around 30 percent of the U.S. population is served 
by public power entities, including city- and municipally-owned utilities, 
 
 15.  Dr. Karl McDermott has described the regulatory compact as an unstated societal 
agreement whereby “[t]he utility was granted an exclusive service franchise/territory, and in 
exchange, accepted the responsibility to serve everyone in the territory and submit to price 
(rate) regulation. The utility was obligated to supply service efficiently, but had the right to 
recover its costs, including an opportunity to earn a return/profit equal to its market-
determined cost of debt and equity capital.”  MCDERMOTT, KARL, COST OF SERVICE REGULATION 
IN THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF ADAPTATION (2012), 
available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/COSR_history_ 
final.pdf. 
 16.  Cost-of-Service Regulation can be defined as “[t]raditional electric utility regulation, 
under which a utility is allowed to set rates based on the cost of providing service to 
customers and the right to earn a limited profit.” REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT at 
107.  Utilities are generally entitled to recover their revenue requirement from customers, 
which “is the sum of operation and maintenance expenses, depreciation, taxes, and a return 
on rate base.” Id. at 117. Rate base is defined as “[t]he total investment used to provide 
service, including working capital, but net of accumulated depreciation.” Id. at 115. 
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and electric cooperatives.  City- and municipally-owned utilities are owned 
by communities and governed by local elected officials or their appointees.  
Electric cooperatives serve historically underserved areas of the country, 
and are jointly owned by customers, or member communities.  Both 
municipal utilities and electric cooperatives are not-for-profit entities, 
and establish their own rates charged to customers. 
Through most of the twentieth century, the most economical means of 
supplying communities with electricity was through large central-station 
generation plants, which employed “economies of scale” to keep electricity 
prices low.17  Over time, utilities thus built larger and larger power plants 
further and further away from load centers, and transmitted electricity to 
customers via transmission lines that sometimes extended hundreds of 
miles.18 
Moreover, as utility companies developed, most were vertically integrated 
in that they owned and operated their own generation facilities, transmission 
systems, and distribution lines.  Beginning in the 1990s, however, some states 
undertook utility restructuring, and required utilities to spinoff or divest their 
generation assets to separate companies or affiliates for the purpose of 
introducing competition in the generation section.19  In states that have 
undergone restructuring, utilities still maintain a monopoly on distribution 
services, but are precluded from owning generation assets. 
DERs––including, “[g]eneration technologies [that] generate electricity 
near the particular load they are intended to serve”20––are not new.  In the 
19th and early 20th centuries, most electricity was produced in close proximity 
to where it was ultimately consumed.  Due to the factors cited above, 
however, the electric industry “gradually converged around gigawatt-scale 
thermal power plants located far from urban centers.”21  While the vast 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Survey of The Potential Benefits of Distributed Generation and Rate-
Related Issues That May Impede Their Expansion at 1-1, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Feb. 
2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/exp-study.pdf. The motivation behind 
establishing “economies of scale” is that “increasingly larger units produc[e] electricity at 
successively lower unit costs.” Id. 
 18.  Id. at 1–2. 
 19.  For an overview of electric restructuring in states see Severin Borenstein & 
James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of Restructuring (Energy Inst. 
at Haas, Working Paper No. 252), available at  http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/working_papers/ 
WP252.pdf. 
 20.  Modeling Distributed Generation in the Buildings Sectors, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. 1 (Aug. 29, 2013). 
 21.  Id. at 1. 
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majority of the electricity consumed in the United States still comes from 
central station power plants, the use of DERs has increased significantly in 
recent years.22   The following discussion focuses on two forms of 
DERs––rooftop solar, and energy storage––and identifies recent efforts 
by utilities to develop these resources. 
A.  The Growth of Distributed Generation Technologies 
1.  Rooftop Solar 
According to the Solar Energy Industry Association, since 2006, solar 
PV installations in the United State have increased an astounding 1,600 
percent, experiencing a compound annual growth rate of 76 percent.23  In 
2006, a new rooftop solar installation was completed every eighty minutes, 
whereas in the first half of 2014 a new rooftop solar installation was 
completed every three minutes.24  Additionally, the top 25 companies that 
utilize rooftop solar in the United States, including companies such as 
Walmart and Apple, have increased their usage by 103 percent since 2012.25 
Several factors have driven this prodigious growth.  First and foremost 
are state net-metering laws, which are utilized by 95 percent of rooftop 
solar installations in the United States.26  Net-metering generally allows 
customers with distributed generation (DG) to export their excess electricity 
back to the grid, and be compensated or credited by utilities at the full 
retail rate.  While the merits of net-metering are hotly contested, and beyond 
the scope of this article, opponents of net-metering generally argue that 
net-metered customers rely on the grid for most of their electricity, but 
pay less for the same amount of grid services than non-net metered 
 
 22.  See Modeling Distributed Generation in the Buildings Sectors, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 29, 2013) available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/nems/2013/ 
buildings/. 
 23.  Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N,  http://www.seia. 
org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
 24.  Solar Energy Facts: Q3 2014, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N (2014), available 
at  https://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-industry-data (last updated Dec.17,  2014). 
 25.  Solar Means Business 2014: Top U.S. Commercial Solar Users, SOLAR ENERGY 
INDUS. ASS’N (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-means-
business-2014-top-us-commercial-solar-users (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). According to SEIA, 
the top companies utilizing solar PV consist of Walmart, Kohl’s, Costco, Apple, IKEA, 
Macy’s, Johnson & Johnson, Target, McGraw Hill, Staples, Campbell’s Soup, U.S. Foods, 
Bed Bath & Beyond, Kaiser Permanente, Volkswagen, Walgreens, Safeway, FedEx, Intel, 
L’Oreal, General Motors, Toys “R” Us, Verizon, White Rose Foods, Toyota and AT&T.  Id. 
 26.  LARRY SHERWOOD, U.S. SOLAR MARKET TRENDS 2013, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE 
ENERGY COUNCIL, INC. (IREC), at 14 (2014). 
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customers.27  Opponents also argue that net-metering laws are anti-
competitive because utilities are forced to purchase net-metered power at an 
artificially high price; utility scale solar, for example, is significantly cheaper 
than rooftop solar, and still provides many of the same environmental 
benefits.28  Advocates of net-metering, in contrast, argue that rooftop solar 
provides numerous societal benefits, such as providing customers with “green 
energy” alternatives, control over their electricity consumption, and 
reduced electricity bills.29 
Another factor that has driven the growth of rooftop solar is the Business 
Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC), which provides tax incentives for 
several DER technologies, including solar.30  The ITC allows individuals 
and companies to claim a 30 percent tax credit for the cost of certain 
generation technologies that meet certain requirements.31  After 2016, 
however, the rate for residential units will be eliminated and the rate for 
commercial units will decline to 10 percent,32 which will likely affect the 
market for rooftop solar, combined heat and power (CHP) and other forms 
of DERs in the future. 
Falling costs of PV technologies have also made rooftop solar more 
accessible.  The average price of a PV panel has dropped by 64 percent 
since 2010,33 which is largely due to a proliferation of lower cost solar panels 
produced in China.34  Despite such declining costs, however, rooftop solar 
systems remain prohibitively expensive for many individuals and 
businesses.  In Arizona, a typical residential rooftop solar system can cost 
 
 27.  See Net Metering, What others are saying, APS, at 1, http://www.azenergy 
future.com/getmedia/ae141374-ec88-436f-94f7-1dcba72e02eb/What-others-are-saying-net 
-metering.pdf/ 
 28.  DAVID FELDMAN ET AL., PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM PRICING TRENDS: HISTORICAL, 
RECENT, AND NEAR-TERM PROJECTIONS (2014), U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.nrel. 
gov/docs/fy14osti/62558.pdf. 
 29.  See, e.g., Issues and Policies, Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http:// 
www.seia.org/policy/distributed-solar/net-metering. 
 30.  26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(3)(A)(i and ii) (2014). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  For example, the average installed cost of PV in 2009 was approximately $7.50 per 
watt, while in $2013 it was $2.89 per watt.  The Case For The Solar Investment Tax Credit 
(ITC), SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, available at http://www.seia.org/research-resources/ 
case-solar-investment-tax-credit-itc. 
 34.  DAVID FELDMAN ET AL., PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM PRICING TRENDS: HISTORICAL, 
RECENT, AND NEAR-TERM PROJECTIONS – 2014 EDITION, available at http://www.nrel.gov/ 
docs/fy14osti/62558.pdf. 
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between $20,000 and $30,000.35  Companies such as SolarCity have 
helped expand the market for rooftop solar by offering customers the ability 
lease solar PV panels for little or no money down in exchange for a 
long-term commitment to purchase the output of the rooftop unit.36    
2.  Distributed Storage 
Unlike rooftop solar, distributed storage, including flywheel, battery, 
and compressed air technologies, has traditionally been too expensive to 
be widely deployed.  But declining technology costs37 and new federal and 
state policies could help make electricity storage more commonplace.  
FERC’s Order No. 755, for example, requires that ancillary service 
providers be compensated based upon their responsiveness to control 
signals, which benefits owners of fast-ramping storage technologies.38  
Likewise, at the state level, California compensates retail customers for 
the use of storage through its Self-Generation Incentive Program.  This 
program offers users of certain storage technologies $1.65/Watt, for a 
maximum of $5 million, or 60 percent of the project’s costs.39 Additionally, 
as discussed below, California has required its three investor-owned utilities to 
procure a significant amount of electricity storage––1300 MW––by 
2020.40  This state mandate alone could have a catalytic effect on the 
electricity storage industry in the United States. 
 
 35.  Ryan Randazzo, Costs of rooftop solar out of reach for many in Arizona , 
AZCENTRAL, http://www.azcentral.com/business/consumer/articles/20130726arizona-solar-costs- 
high.html. 
 36.  Mathias Aarre Maehlum, Best Solar Lease and PPA – SolarCity, SunRun, Sungevity, 
SunPower or Real Goods Solar?, ENERGY INFORMATIVE, available at http://energy informative. 
org/best-solar-lease-ppa-solarcity-sunrun-sungevity-sunpower/. 
 37.  Public reports now forecast a decline in the cost from the current $700–$3,000 
per kWh of installed electricity storage in 2014 to less than half of that over the next three 
years. Some analyst projections and vendor quotes point to even more significant cost 
reductions, forecasting that the installed costs of battery systems will drop to 
approximately $350/kWh by 2020.  JUDY CHANG ET AL., THE VALUE OF DISTRIBUTED 
ELECTRICITY STORAGE IN TEXAS: PROPOSED POLICY FOR ENABLING GRID-INTEGRATED 
STORAGE INVESTMENTS 2 (The Brattle Group 2014), availabe at http://www.brattle.com/ 
system/news/pdfs/000/000/749/original/The_Value_of_Distributed_Electricity_Storage_
in_Texas.pdf. 
 38.  Frequency Regulation in the Organized Whole Sale Markets, 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,064, 
at 2 (2011).39. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 23. 
 39.  SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 23. 
 40.  Jeff St. John, California Passes Huge Grid Energy Store Mandate, GREENTECH 
MEDIA, INC. (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/california-passes- 
huge-grid-energy-storage-mandate. 
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B.  Benefits and Costs 
The state and federal policies described above are “premised on the 
range of societal benefits that [DERs] may provide[.]”41  While such 
“benefits” may vary according to the perspective of the stakeholder, 
commonly cited benefits of DERs include: generation and capacity 
values, deferred transmission and distribution investments, reduced line 
losses, fuel cost hedging and environmental and reliability benefits.42  
DER units cost less per project, and have fewer environmental permitting 
requirements,43 than large central station power plants.  Thus, investments in 
DERs may help utilities avoid costs they would otherwise incur in 
building new power plants, or in acquiring energy or capacity from 
wholesale markets.  Additionally, a greater reliance on DERs can produce 
efficiencies over and above the current grid configuration. For example, 
around 5 to 8 percent of electricity that flows through transmission lines 
is lost in the form of heat.44  DERs reduce these line losses by producing 
electricity in close proximity to where it is ultimately consumed.45 
Another potential benefit of DERs is enhanced reliability.  As 
demonstrated during Superstorm Sandy in 2012, buildings with their own 
CHP units,46 or campuses with their own microgrids,47 were able to keep 
 
 41.  ANDREW SATCHWELL ET AL., FINANCIAL IMPACTS OF NET-METERED PV ON UTILITIES 
AND RATEPAYERS: A SCOPING STUDY OF TWO PROTOTYPICAL U.S. UTILITIES 1 (2014). 
 42.  See ELECTRICITY INNOVATION LAB ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, A REVIEW OF 
SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST STUDIES 31 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
INSTITUTE]. Depending on your perspective, DERs may not provide benefits at all. i.e., 
“efficient energy storage combined with distributed generation could create the ultimate risk to 
grid viability.” PETER KIND, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND 
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL BUSINESS 3 (Edison Electric Inst. 2013). 
 43.  TODD FOLEY ET AL., AMERICA’S POWER PLAN: FINANCE POLICY: REMOVING 
INVESTMENT BARRIERS AND MANAGING RISK 16, available at http://americaspowerplan. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/APP-FINANCE.pdf. 
 44.  The Potential Benefits of Distributed Generation and Rate-Related Issues that 
may Impede Their Expansion: A Study Pursuant to Section 1817 of the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 3–18 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY]. 
 45.  For example, according to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission , 
approximately 5 to 8 percent of electricity was lost between power plants and final 
consumption in the U.S. from 1993 to 2007. 
 46.  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 45. 
 47.  Princeton University, which has its own microgrid, was able to switch its 
microgrid to “island mode,” and insulate key campus buildings from blackouts that affected 
much of New Jersey. See Morgan Kelly, Two years after Hurricane Sandy, recognition of 
Princeton’s microgrid still surges, NEWS AT PRINCETON (Oct. 23, 2014), available at 
https://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S41/40/10C78/index.xml?section=featured. 
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electricity flowing despite blackouts in the surrounding areas.  Likewise, 
rooftop solar, while an intermittent resource, was also able to provide needed 
electricity in the weeks after the storm when the main transmission grid was 
down and fuel for backup generators could not be resupplied.48 
Additional benefits of DERs can include deferred distribution and 
transmission system upgrades,49 and environmental benefits from emission 
free solar PV and high efficiency CHP.  In certain states, these “green” DER 
technologies may contribute to state renewable portfolio and energy 
efficiency requirements, and provide owners with additional revenue through 
Renewable or Energy Efficiency Credits. 
Despite such benefits, however, DERs present a variety of challenges 
to the electricity system.  A very high penetration of DERs, such as rooftop 
solar, could disrupt distribution circuits unless certain controls are utilized.50 
Additionally, customer-sited DERs may erode utility revenues due to fewer 
retail sales, deferred capital investments, and operational and siting 
challenges.51  The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, for example, 
has found that if rooftop solar penetration reaches 2.5 percent (it is currently 
0.2% nationally) shareholder earnings for some utilities could fall by 4 
percent.52  Additionally, if rooftop solar penetration were to reach 10 percent—
a typical utility in the Southwest could see its earnings drop between 5 and 
13 percent, and a typical utility in the Northeast could see earnings decline 
between 6 and 41 percent.53  Over time, such lost revenue could have larger 
ramifications such as by impacting shareholder returns, raising a utility’s’ 
cost of capital, and potentially requiring rate-increases to fund infrastructure 
investments.  
Thus, although DERs can offer significant benefits to society, customer 
sited-DERs also impose costs on utilities.  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that utilities have begun exploring new business models to capitalize on 
 
 48.  See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, supra note 43, at 7, 8; Stephen Lacey, Amidst a 
Surge in Extreme Weather Distributed Energy Takes on New Meaning for the US Grid, 
GREENTECH MEDIA, available at https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/featured/after- 
superstorm-sandy-states-look-to-distributed-energy-and-microgrids. 
 49.  As discussed infra the Long Island Power Authority is paying developers to 
install rooftop solar facilities in some small Long Island communities, which have a growing 
need for electricity, but lack the infrastructure to meet that demand.  This initiative is expected 
to save the utility $80 million that would otherwise be spent building new transmission 
lines and grid.  See Maria Gallucci, Why Are Some Big Utilities Embracing Small-Scale 
Solar Power?, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://insideclimate 
news.org/news/20130912/why-are-some-big-utilities-embracing-small-scale-solar-power. 
 50.  See e.g. HAWAII PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, Case 2011-0206, Proceeding to Investigate 
the Implementation of Reliability Standards, Order 32053, at 35. 
 51.  See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, supra note 42, at 7, 8. 
 52.  SATCHWELL, supra note 41. 
 53.  Id. at 32. 
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an expanding market for DER services.  These efforts have taken the form of 
both investments by regulated utilities, which are subject to oversight by 
state commission, and by utility affiliates, which are walled off from the 
regulated utility and function like private companies.  Where the regulated 
utility develops DER “notable benefits to the utility include the ability to 
put [DER] assets in the utility rate base and to strategically locate [DERs] on 
the grid to obtain optimal value and efficiency for the overall electrical 
system.”54 State utility commissions must approve these investments, and 
ratepayers would assume some of the risk of these ventures.55  Where the 
unregulated affiliate invests in DERs, both the risk and reward of the 
venture would generally be allocated to the company’s shareholders. 
II.  UTILITY INVESTMENTS IN DERS 
Both regulated utilities and unregulated utility affiliates have proposed 
a number of DER programs in recent years.56  And while utilities have 
shown the most interest in rooftop solar, one can imagine a multitude of 
DER services provided by utilities. However, utility investments in DERs are 
not without their risks.  As discussed below, Southern California Edison 
(SCE), which was one of the first regulated utilities to propose and 
implement its own rooftop solar program, ultimately suspended its rooftop 
solar program prior to completion.   At least part of the reason why SCE 
suspended its rooftop solar program was because of the regulatory restrictions 
imposed by the California Public Utilities Commission.  SCE’s experience, 
thus, may inform other utilities regarding the conditions under which utilities 
can effectively “compete directly on a regulated basis for behind-the-meter 
energy services in their franchise service areas[,]”57 as some commentators 
have advocated.   
 
 54.  Bird, supra note 4, at 25. 
 55.  SATCHWELL, supra note 41, at 56. 
 56.  Arizona Public Services, a regulated utility in Arizona, has been authorized to 
develop 8 MW of solar PV systems on 1,500 rooftops within its service territory, the costs 
for which will be determined in a future rate case, in addition to another  See ARIZ. CORP.  
COMM’N, Decision No. 74878 (Dec. 23, 2014); Duke Energy Renewables, an unregulated 
subsidiary of the nation’s largest electric utility, has developed 10 MW of commercial 
rooftop solar facilities across 25 sites in North Carolina. See North Carolina Solar 
Distributed Generation, DUKE ENERGY,  available at http://www.duke-energy.com/north-carolina/ 
renewable-energy/nc-solar-distributed-generation-program.asp. 
 57.  See, e.g., John Slocum, Threat From Behind the Meter, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 
(July 2013), http://www.ceadvisors.com/publications/reportsandpublications/Public%20 
Utilities%20Fortnightly_Threat%20from%20Behind%20the%20Meter_Slocum.pdf. 
WINMILL(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  11:29 AM 
 
210 
A.  Utility Investments in Rooftop Solar 
In 2008, SCE––motivated by California’s ambitious renewable portfolio 
standard58––requested permission from the California PUC to build 250 
MW of primarily rooftop solar installations within its service territory, and 
recover the cost in rates.59  Each of the proposed rooftop solar installations 
would be between 1 and 2 MW, and would be located on buildings that do 
not typically employ net-metering, such as warehouses.60  At the time of 
its proposal, SCE had not selected the specific sites in question, but would do 
so according to several rubrics, including sun exposure, and the structural 
integrity of the buildings.61 
SCE’s proposed price tag for the program was $875 million, which 
averaged out to $3.50 per watt.62  This price-point was around half the 
average cost of installed solar PV capacity in the state.63  According to SCE, 
it could deliver on this low cost “through economies of scale and  
improvements in technology and efficiency.”64  Specifically, SCE suggested 
that it could “. . . obtain volume discounts for its proposed base case 
investment of $875 million,” and could “utilize its established electric supply 
relationships with potential vendors and commercial building lessors who are 
also its customers.”65  SCE argued that it could produce electricity more cost 
effectively than private competitors because of economies of scale, pre-
existing customer relationships, and other attributes commonly associated with 
utilities.66 
The California PUC approved SCE’s request to develop 250 MW of 
Utility Owned Generation (UOG) over five years and required that 90 
percent of systems to be located on commercial rooftops and 10 percent 
to be ground-mounted.67  Importantly, the California PUC also required 
SCE to double the program’s size, and to solicit competitive bids from 
independent developers (IPPs) for an additional 250 MW of rooftop solar, 
 
 58.  See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.15(b)(1). 
 59.  Application of Southern California Edison Company (U338-E) for Authority to 
Implement and Recover in Rates the Cost of its Proposed Solar Photovoltaic (PV) 
Program, Docket No. A.08-03-015 (filed Mar. 27, 2008) (2008 Application). 
 60.  Id. at 3. 
 61.  Id. at 11. 
 62.  Id. at 13. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Decision Addressing a Solar Photovoltaic Program For Southern California 
Edison Company, Docket No. A.08-03-015 (June 22, 2009). 
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which would also be developed within SCE’s service territory.68 The costs 
of the UOG portion of the program were subject to cost-of-service 
ratemaking, and would be capped at the proffered $3.50 per watt, plus a 
10 percent contingency.69  Any costs in excess of this amount would undergo 
a reasonableness review.70 
After only two years of administering the program, however, SCE 
requested permission to scale back its program.  In February 2011, SCE 
filed its first Petition for Modification, and requested permission to 
downsize the program by half,71  and obtain the remainder through California’s 
new Renewable Auction Mechanism.72  SCE also sought to increase the 
ground-mounted percentage of the program from 10 percent to 20 percent.  As 
justification for these changes, SCE cited the economic downturn of 2008, 
a lack of new commercial and industrial rooftop space, and competition 
between the IPP and UOG portions of the program for available rooftop 
locations.73  SCE also argued that these reductions would result in savings 
to ratepayers of $300 million.  The California PUC agreed and modified 
the program as requested.74 
In May 2012, just two months after the California PUC granted this 
request, SCE requested an additional reduction in the UOG portion of the 
program––this time from 125 MW to 110 MW.75  While SCE’s second 
request was denied on procedural grounds, in July 2012 SCE filed a 
third and final request to modify the program––from 125 MW to 91 MW.  
According to SCE “continuing circumstances have made it difficult and 
 
 68.  Id. at 1. According to the California PUC, the comparison of UOG and IPP 
projects would provide “important information about the costs and benefits of each form 
of renewable facility ownership, including both the sharing of risks between various 
stakeholders and the ultimate effect on ratepayers.” Id. at 58. 
 69.  Id. at 58. 
 70.  Decisions Partially Granting Southern California Edison Company’s Petition 
for Modification of Decision 09-06-049 (SPVP) and Making Conforming Changes to Decision 
10-12-049 (RAM), at 15 (Feb. 23, 2012). 
 71.  Southern California Edison Company’s (U 338-E) Petition for Modification of 
Decision 09-06-049 (filed Feb. 11, 2011). 
 72.  Under the Renewable Auction Mechanism, utilities can acquire the output of 
independent renewable generation projects, which are between 3 MW and 20 MW, which are 
located on the utility side of the meter, and can be sited anywhere within the footprint of 
the California Independent System Operator. See http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/ 
Renewables/hot/Renewable+Auction+Mechanism.htm. 
 73.  See supra note 60, at 8. 
 74.  Id. at 11. 
 75.  Advice Letter 2724-E, Pub. Utilities Comm’n, to Akbar Jazayeri, VP of Regulatory 
Operations, S. Cal. Edison Co., at 1-2 (filed May 1, 2012). 
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less economical to build []PV projects . . .”76  Specifically, SCE inferred that 
it could not cost effectively develop its proposed projects as a result of 
“overloaded or constrained circuits . . . building roof conditions. . . difficulties 
in obtaining building tenant or landlord construction approval, . . . inability to 
obtain a suitable building permit to construct the solar facility, interconnection 
applications that require[d] unanticipated upgrades which cause 
excessive costs and lengthy interconnection construction schedules, 
and the economics of smaller sized roofs that are not viable under the cost 
requirements of [the PUC authorization].77 
A few lessons may be drawn from SCE’s experience with its rooftop 
solar program.  First, the regulatory constraints placed on the SCE program 
likely had a significantly negative affect on SCE’s ability to develop 
rooftop solar units cost effectively. From the outset, the California PUC 
required SCE to fund an equal number of private projects, and compete 
against those private projects for finite rooftop space.  Moreover, the costs 
of SCE’s solar projects were capped at around half the average cost of rooftop 
solar capacity in the state at the time (although SCE, not the California 
PUC, originally proposed these cost parameters). Second, although 
SCE was attempting to develop a new market for very large rooftop solar 
arrays, in 2008, California already had the most robust private market for 
distributed solar in the United States.78 Building owners thus had several 
options when choosing rooftop solar developers. Thus, having to compete for 
finite locations at an administratively determined price point likely hindered 
SCE’s rooftop solar program, whereas private developers, without these 
limitations, and with the benefit of net-metering, continue to flourish in 
California.   
B.  Utility Ownership of Energy Storage 
Unlike rooftop solar, there is not a robust private market for distributed 
storage.  This is because the price of distributed storage has historically 
been too high to attract significant investment.79  Additionally, electricity 
storage is subject to some regulatory uncertainty because it has “characteristics that 
sometimes bring value to generation and other times to transmission or 
 
 76.  Advice Letter 2724-E/E-A, Pub. Utilities Comm’n, to Akbar Jazayeri, VP of 
Regulatory Operations, S. Cal. Edison Co., at 1–2 (Nov. 14, 2012), available at http://www. 
cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/hot/Renewable+Auction+Mechanism.htm. 
 77.  Petition for Modification of Decision 12-02-035, (July 27, 2012), at 7. 
 78.  Susan V. Lee, Alternatives, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N  (Oct. 2009), http://docs. 
cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/NEWS_RELEASE/96627.htm. 
 79.  See CHANG, supra note 37, at 1. 
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distribution.”80  Despite these issues, storage offers significant benefits to 
users, prompting utilities, states and private developers to take steps to 
increase the use of distributed storage. 
In 2010, California signed into law Assembly Bill No. 2514, which 
directed the California PUC to determine whether to impose electricity 
storage targets on the investor-owned utilities in the state.81  After 
considering the issue, in 2013 the California PUC issued an order directing 
the state’s three investor-owned utilities to procure over 1300 MW of 
distributed storage by 2020.82  Under the order, the utilities would be 
allowed to use distributed storage for various purposes including capacity, 
ancillary services, and peak shaving.  Moreover, the utilities will be able 
to recover the costs of their procurements in rates based on the service a 
specific storage project is designed to perform.83  As with SCE’s rooftop 
solar program, however, the California PUC found that utilities may own 
no more than half of all of the storage projects that would count towards 
their targets84 and must procure the remainder from third party developers.  
The California PUC also held that the storage systems owned by the utilities 
could either be interconnected to the transmission grid, or located behind 
the customer’s meter.85 
While it is too soon to tell how California’s ambitious storage programs 
will fare, it is arguable that California’s investor-owned utilities will not 
encounter the same obstacles that SCE faced with its rooftop solar program.  
This is because, unlike SCE’s rooftop solar program, the California utilities 
will not be required to develop and operate storage projects for substantially 
 
 80.  Kaun, B., S. Chen, Cost-Effectiveness of Energy Storage in California: Application of 
the EPRI Energy Storage Valuation Tool to Inform the California Public Utility Commission, 
at 2–1, Proceeding R. 10-12-007, ELECTRIC POWER RES. INST. (June 2013), available at 
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=0000000030 02001162. 
 81.  2014 Storage Plan Assessment Recommendations for the U.S. Department of 
Energy, ELECTRIC ADVISORY COMM. (Sept. 2014), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca. 
gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100AB2514 . 
 82.  Order Instituting Rulemaking pursuant to Assembly Bill 2514 to Consider the 
Adoption of Procurement Targets for Viable and Cost-Effective Energy Storage Systems, 
Decision 13-10-040 (issued Oct. 17, 2013). 
 83.  Application of SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY (U902M) for Approval of 
its Energy Storage Procurement Framework and Program As Required by Decision 13-
10-040, at 40 Decision 14-10-045 (Oct. 16, 2014). 
 84.  Id. at 52. 
 85.  Id. at 59.  Specifically, the California PUC stated that “there may be beneficial 
applications of utility-owned or utility-contracted storage projects behind the meter. 
Therefore, we will not preclude utility ownership or contracts of customer-side storage.” 
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less than the going market rate, as was required of SCE in the context of 
its solar program.  Additionally, the market for distributed storage is much 
less mature than it is for rooftop solar,86 and California utilities are unlikely 
to face substantial competition in providing distributed storage to customers. 
Finally, storage does not depend upon specific siting conditions to be 
effective, and can be located nearly anywhere as the case may require. 
Although not addressed by the California PUC, it may also be the case 
that the particular attributes of distributed storage actually lend themselves to 
utility investments in a way solar technologies do not.  According to Oncor, 
Inc., for example, a distribution utility in Texas, utility investments in storage 
may actually be necessary to unlocking the broad societal benefits of storage 
technologies.  
As detailed in a November 2014 report,87 Oncor analyzed the conditions 
under which energy storage could be cost-effectively deployed in Texas.88 
After evaluating the benefits to merchant developers, society-at-large, and 
rate-paying customers,89 Oncor concluded that if the installed cost of 
battery storage drops to approximately $350 per kilowatt-hour, which it is 
anticipated to do by 2020, “up to 5,000 MW . . . of grid interconnected, 
distributed electricity storage would be cost effective from a . . . system-
wide societal perspective.”90  This amount of storage would cost roughly 
$5.2 billion. But, as a result of the investment, the grid in Texas would be less 
congested, it would require fewer upgrades, and rate-paying customers 
would see their electricity bills go down slightly. 91  Additionally, 
rate-paying customers would “obtain additional reliability benefits in the 
form of reduced power outages.”92 
According to Oncor, however, such a significant investment in storage 
is unlikely to be made under current regulatory and market conditions.93  
Merchant developers are unlikely to make investments at this scale, because 
the costs of storage cannot be recouped through the wholesale energy 
 
 86.  As reported by the U.S. Department of Energy, there are only around 20 third-
party owned distributed storage projects, which are currently operational in California. See 
http://www.energystorageexchange.org/ (last visited Apr.16, 2015). 
 87.  See CHANG, supra note 37. 
 88.  Id. at 2. 
 89.  Id at 5.  According to the Oncor Report, merchant values include the profits a 
private investor could capture in wholesale power markets, which are driven by energy 
arbitrage values and ancillary services prices. Societal benefits include: 1) avoided 
distribution outages; 2) deferred transmission and distribution investments; 3) production 
cost savings; and 3) avoided generation investments.  Customer benefits include the 
societal benefits, in addition to power purchase cost savings, and customer bill offsets. 
 90.  Id. at 2. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 17. 
WINMILL(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  11:29 AM 
[VOL. 6:  199, 2014–15] Electric Utilities and Distributed Energy 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 215 
markets alone.94  Likewise, utilities are unlikely to make such significant 
investments in storage because the same benefits can be obtained more 
cheaply through other technologies.  Additionally, Texas has a de-regulated 
retail electricity market,95 which may preclude utilities in Texas from owning 
electricity storage as a matter of law. 
To overcome these obstacles, Oncor has recommended regulatory changes 
to allow utilities to own and operate electric storage on the distribution 
system, and then auction the excess storage capacity to market participants 
through arms-length transactions.  These market participants could then 
“schedule the charging and discharging of the storage devices to maximize 
revenue on the wholesale markets.”96  Proceeds from the auction would 
be used to reduce costs to ratepayers.  According to Oncor, this scenario 
would overcome “the barriers created by fragmented value streams that 
will otherwise lead to under-investment in electric energy storage[,]”97  
while also respecting the barrier between regulated utilities and market 
activity. 
The Oncor proposal is likely to generate important questions regarding 
the classification of energy storage under law, and whether the benefits of 
storage justify the significant expenditures recommended by Oncor.  
However, Oncor’s proposal is significant because it presents a credible 
means for allocating the diffused benefits of energy storage to the actors 
most willing to pay for them.  Additionally, the proposal demonstrates 
how the involvement of utilities and private developers can help realize 
the full benefits of distributed storage.  Although California has not 
implemented a similar plan, adopting elements of Oncor’s proposal could 
help ensure the California’s storage program is deployed as cost effectively 
as possible, and could be a model for other utilities and states in the future. 
III.  REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 
As demonstrated by SCE’s experience with its rooftop solar program, 
utility investments in DERs may not always be cost-effective, which may 
be due to both regulatory constraints and competition from private 
developers.  In contrast, with regard to California’s storage mandate and 
Oncor’s storage proposal, utility investments may be an important, or even 
 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Tex. S.B. 7 (Jan. 1, 2002). 
 96.  Id. at 18. 
 97.  Id. 
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an indispensable, factor in unleashing the societal benefits of particular DER 
technologies. 
Two states, New York and Arizona, are developing distinct regulatory 
regimes governing utility ownership of DERs.  In New York, with the 
Reforming Energy Vision initiative, the New York Commission is attempting 
to create distribution-level energy markets that rely heavily on DERs, but 
prohibit utilities from owning or investing in DERs in most circumstances.98  
In contrast, Arizona’s Consumer Office encourages utility ownership of 
DERs “as long as a balanced, level playing field is established.”99 
These two contrasting visions for utility investment in DERs will likely 
result in their own unique opportunities and challenges.  However, both 
the New York and Arizona models contain a presumption that where utility 
investments in DERs are authorized, they should primarily focus on areas not 
being addressed by private markets.  This presumption was perhaps also 
evident in the California PUC treatment of SCE, when it required SCE to 
fund an equal number of independent rooftop projects.  As utilities 
consider what role they may play in the expanding DER economy, 
investing in new markets and technologies may thus be more favorably 
received by regulators, and thus provide greater investment opportunities, 
than efforts to compete in established DER markets.    
A.  New York’s Reforming Energy Vision 
In the Reforming Energy Vision proceeding, the New York Commission 
evaluated the costs and benefits of utility investments in DERs, by both 
regulated utilities and their unregulated affiliates, and concluded that “with 
a few exceptions . . . DER will remain a non-utility service provided by the 
competitive market.”100 With regard to regulated utility investments in 
DERs, the New York Commission observed that such utilities may have 
opportunities to exercise market power by, for example, using non-public 
information to secure prime DER locations on the distribution grid, or 
slow-walking interconnection requests from competitors.101  The New 
York Commission determined it could likely mitigate these market power 
concerns,102 but concluded nonetheless that “even the potential for utility 
ownership risks discouraging potential investment from competitive 
 
 98.  REV at 48 & 67. 
 99.  RUCO Comments, supra note 12, at 1. 
 100.  REV at 52. 
 101.  See REV at 69; see The Alliance for Solar Choice, Motion to Dismiss, Docket 
No. E-01345A-13-0140 at 10 (filed Aug. 15, 2014). 
 102.  These include, that utilities that own DERs will be restricted to recovery of their 
actual costs, and REV market will not deploy bid based auctions but will rely on the use 
of tariffs. REV at 66–67. 
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providers” and that  “[m]arkets will thrive best where there is both the 
perception and the reality of a level playing field and that is best 
accomplished by restricting the ability of utilities to participate” in DER 
markets.103 
With this general presumption in mind, however, the New York 
Commission, found that utility ownership of DERs should be authorized 
where “markets have had an opportunity to provide a [DER] service but 
have failed to do so in a cost effective manner.”104  Specifically, the New 
York Commission stated that “[t]here will be circumstances where the utility 
identifies a resource need for new transmission or a distribution plant that 
could be met by greater penetration of DER.”105 Where there is not effective 
third party proposals to meet the need as part of a competitive process, “the 
utility can present to the [New York] Commission an alternative that 
will support some level of utility investment[,]” and will be paid for on a 
regulated basis by rate payers.106 
The New York Commission was more permissive with regard to utility 
affiliates, finding that affiliate investments outside of a utility’s service 
territory should generally be allowed because they don’t present market 
power concerns.107  Moreover, restricting these investments “would limit 
the choices available to customers and might have the effect of dampening 
customer engagement in DERs.”108  However, affiliate investments within a 
utility’s service territory present risk of discriminatory treatment.109  Thus, 
where affiliates compete for projects within a utility’s service territory, a third 
party will need to determine winners in competitive solicitations, or report 
directly to the New York Commission where that is not possible.110  Codes 
of conduct will also need to be in place to mitigate market power 
 
 103.  Id. at 67. 
 104.  Id. at 70. The other instances where utilities would be authorized to invest in 
DERs include where a project consists of energy storage integrated into the distribution  
system in order to “support greater penetration of intermittent renewable resources without 
compromising system reliability[,]” a project will enable low or moderate income customers to 
benefit from DERs, and markets are not likely to satisfy the need” or where a project is 
being sponsored for demonstration purposes.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 68. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 71. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
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concerns,111 and caps on utility-affiliate market share may be considered in 
the future. 
B.  Arizona’s Policy Statement on Utility Owned DERs 
In contrast to New York’s Reforming Energy Vision initiative, the 
Arizona Consumer Office argues that utility DER investments will benefit 
consumers, so long as a level playing field can be established.112 Specifically, 
in its Policy Statement on Utility Owned DG, the Arizona Consumer Office 
states that “[w]ith geo-targeting, capacity value improving orientations, 
and advanced inverters, the utility is in a unique position to maximize the 
value of [DER] resources to the grid.”113  Thus, in order to realize these 
benefits, the Arizona Consumer Office has sought to develop a holistic 
policy framework to accommodate DER investments from both utilities and 
third parties.  Under this framework, which is based on seven guiding 
principles,114 “[t]he utility should not be completely immune from market 
forces while having a ‘blank check’ to install [DER] systems” and likewise, 
“third party developers should not be overly compensated through generous 
rate design while having no responsibility [for] grid management 
concerns.”115   
One principle governing this proposed regulatory design is for “utilit[ies 
to] focus on serving markets not optimally suited to third party developers.”116  
This presumption would not preclude utilities from investing in rooftop 
solar, for example, which is a prevalent DER technology in Arizona.117  
 
 111.  Id. One model for such a code of conduct is the FERC’s “Standards of Conduct,” 
which generally requires that a utility’s transmission function and marketing function 
employees operate independently of each other. Also the Standards of Conduct prohibit 
passing transmission function information to marketing function employees, and imposes 
posting requirements to help detect any instances of undue preference. See 18 C.F.R. pt. 
358 (2014). 
 112.  RUCO Comments, supra note 12, at 11. 
 113.  Id. at 5. 
 114.  These seven principles are: 1) lowest cost program design for utility owned DG 
that does not cost more to ratepayers than the third party “revenue loss/cost shift”; 2) 
shared commit to providing accurate information and quality systems to customers; 3) Fair 
interconnection polices for third party owned systems; 4) shared responsibilities around 
grid safety and vitality as issues arise with higher levels of penetration; 5) appropriate rate 
design for customers of third party systems that avoids gross over or under compensation; 6) 
transparent sharing of non-confidential information between the utility and third party 
developers; and 7) utility focus on serving markets not optimally suited for third party 
developers.  Id. at 2. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  In fact, using its new policy framework, the Arizona Consumer Office supported 
Tucson Electric Power’s recent proposal to own 3.5 MW of residential owned rooftop 
solar.  Id. at 3. Under the TEP proposal, customers would be charged a $250 fee, and would be 
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Rather, this presumption would help incentivize DER proposals in novel 
areas that private markets haven’t addressed, which would inurn to the 
benefit of individuals that would otherwise be deprived of the advantages of 
certain DER technologies. 
As demonstrated above, the New York and Arizona proposals diverge 
on the question of utility ownership of DERs. While the New York 
Commission contends that even the appearance of utility investment in 
DERs will suppress third party participation, the Arizona Consumer Office 
sees clear benefits from utility ownership.  Despite these differences, both 
state policies share a preference for utility investments in areas not likely 
to be being addressed by private markets.  An example of such an area, 
which could potentially be acceptable under both the New York and Arizona 
regulatory designs, would be a proposal for a utility to develop distributed 
storage along the lines suggested by Oncor in Texas.  A proposal along 
these lines, if accepted, would provide a utility with substantial investment 
opportunities, and would also provide society as a whole with the numerous 
benefits of distributed storage.  In contrast when SCE sought to own 250 
MW of rooftop solar, the California PUC imposed stringent regulatory 
requirements, including the funding of a significant number of independent 
rooftop solar projects within SCE’s service territory, which likely inhibited 
the success of SCE’s program. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Regardless of where a state falls on the regulatory spectrum, a point of 
common ground among states appears to be a preference for utilities to 
invest in DERs that are not being addressed by private markets. Where 
utilities have been authorized to compete against third-party developers, 
regulators have imposed strict requirements that appear to have limited the 
success of these utility proposals.  In the future, a strategic orientation by 
utilities to develop DER technologies in new or underutilized markets may 
not only provide utilities with more fruitful investment opportunities, and 
 
locked into a set rate for up to 25 years based on their average historic energy usage, unless 
their energy use changes by more than 15 percent.  The fixed price could allow customers 
to generate significant savings if TEP’s rates increase in future.  The Arizona Corporation 
Commission approved the TEP as a demonstration project, and will require to TEP seek 
cost recovery in a future rate case. See Julia Pyper, Arizona Utilities Get Approval to Own 
Rooftop Solar, GREENTECHSOLAR: (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/ 
read/arizona-utilites-get-the-go-ahead-to-own-rooftop-solar. 
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fewer regulatory constraints, but also provide communities with the 
benefits of DERs that may not otherwise be developed. 
 
